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National Bureau of Economic Research.FROM BISMARCK TO WOODCOCK: THE "IRRATIONAL" PURSUIT
OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
"Uniformity of practice seldom continues long without good reason."
——Samuel Johnson, 1775
"If an economic policy has been adopted by many communities, or if it
is persistently pursued by a society over a long span of time, it is
fruitful to assume that the real effects were known and desired."
——George Stigler, 1975
Almost a century ago Prince Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck,
the principal creator and first Reichschancellor of the new German nation—
state, introduced publicly—financed health insurance to the Western world.
Since then, nation after nation has followed his lead until today almost
every developed country has a full—blown national health insurance plan.
Some significant benchmarks along the way are the Russian system (intro-
duced by Lenin after the Bolshevik Revolution), the British National
Health Service (Beveridge and Bevan, 1945), and the Canadian federal—
provincial plans (hospital care in the late l950s, physicians' services
in the late l960s). In nearly all cases these plans built on previous
systems of medical organization and finance that reflected particular
national traditions, values, and circumstances.'
In some health plans, such as those in the communist countries,
the government has direct responsibility for providing services. In
others, the production of medical care is still at least partially in
the private sector, but the payment for care is through taxes or compul-
sory insurance premiums which are really ear—marked taxes. Even in the
United States, the last major holdout against the world—wide trend,2
government funds pay directly for almost half of all health care expendi-
tures and pay indirectly for an appreciable additional share through tax
exemptions and allowances.2 Moreover, most observers believe it is only
a question of when Congress will enact national health insurance, not if
it will.
Almost as obvious (to many economists) as the rise of public
subsidy of health insurance is the "irrational" aspect of. such programs.
Health insurance, in effect, reduces the price the consumer faces at the
time of purchase of medical care and therefore induces excessive demand.
Because the direct cost to the consumer is less than the true cost to
society of providing that care, he tends to over—consume medical care
relative to other goods and services. This misallocation of resources
results in a significant "welfare loss," which Martin Feldstein has
estimated at a minimum of $5 billion per annum in the United States.3
Not only does society seem to be irrationally bent on encouraging
people to over—use medical care, but in the free market for health insur-
ance people also tend to buy the "wrong" kind. Most economists agree
that to the extent that health insurance serves a useful purpose it is
to protect consumers against large, unexpected bills for medical care.
All insurance policies are actuarily "unfair," that is, they carry a load
factor for administrative costs, but if consumers are risk averse, it is
worthwhile for them to pay these costs in order to protect themselves
against unpredictable (for the individual) large losses. It follows,
therefore, that consumers should prefer major medical (catastrophe)
insurance, i.e. plans with substantial deductibles or co—payment provi-
sions for moderate expenses but ample coverage for very large expenses.3
Instead, we observe a strong preference for "first dollar" or shallow
coverage. Of the privately held hospital insurance policies in the United
States, the number covering the first day of hospitalization are several
times greater than the number covering long—term stays.
Another apparent irrationality with respect to health insurance
was alleged by Milton Friedman in a Newsweek column in April, 1975. He
noted that Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Automobile Workers,
is leading the drive for universal comprehensive national health insur-
ance despite the fact that such a measure is
against the interest of ... membersof his own union, and
even of the officials of that union. ...TheUAW is a strong
union and its members are among the highest paid industrial workers.
If they wish to receive part of their pay in the form of medical
care, they can afford, and hence can get, a larger amount than the
average citizen. But in a governmental program, they are simply
average citizens. In addition, a union or company plan would be
far more responsive to their demands and needs than a universal
national plan, so that they would get more per dollar spent.4
Friedman says that Woodcock is an "intelligent man," and therefore finds
his behavior a "major puzzle."
From Bismarck to Woodcock, it seems that economists are drowning
in a sea of irrationality. But other economists warn us against jumping
to the "irrationality" conclusion. In particular, George Stigler has
taught us to look beyond the surface appearance of political actions
in search of their actual consequences and of the interests that they
serve. He writes,
It seems unfruitful ... toconclude from the studies of the
effects of various policies that those policies which did not
achieve their announced goals, or had perverse effects ..
aresimply mistakes of the society.5
In short, when confronted with some consistent and widespread behavior
which we cannot explain, we should not blithely assume that it is4
attributable to lack of information or bad judgment. We should be wary
of what might be called the "fallacy of misplaced ignorance." It may
be that the behavior we observe is more consistent with the self—interest
of particular individuals or groups than it first appears.
It is to George Stigler that we are also indebted for the
"survivor principle," one of his many contributions to the study of
industrial organization.6 The basic notion is simple: if we want to learn
something about the relative efficiency of differently sized firms in an
industry, Stigler tells us to look at that industry over time and notice
which size classes seem to flourish and which do not. Can the "survivor
principle" be applied to institutions as well? If so, national health
insurance seems to pass with flying colors. No country that has tried it
has abandoned it, and those that have tried it partially usually expand
it. It may not be unreasonable to infer, therefore, that national health
insurance does serve some general interests. That is, there may be some
welfare gains lying below the surface that more than offset the losses
so apparent to many economists. An exploration of some of the special
or general benefits that might explain the widespread pursuit of national
health insurance follows.
The U.S. Already Has Implicit National Health Insurance
Some of the observed behavior would seem less irrational if we
assume that the U.S. already has implicit national health insurance,
especially for catastrophic illness. If it is true that most uninsured
people who need care can get it one way or another——through government
hospitals, philanthropy, or bad debts——then it may be rational for people5
to buy only shallow coverage, or indeed, not to buy any insurance at all.
To suggest that there is implicit insurance in the United States covering
nearly everyone is not at all to suggest that there is equal access to
equal quality care. We know that so—called free care may often have some
stigma attached to it, may be less pleasant and less prompt, and may fail
in other ways as well. But it cannot be denied that a good deal of
medical care is delivered every year in the United States to persons who
do not have explicit insurance or the money to pay for it.
Those persons without explicit insurance are essentially free—
riders. Those who do carry extensive insurance, such as the automobile
workers, in effect pay twice——once through the premiums for their own insurance
and again through taxes or inflated costs to cover care for those without
explicit insurance. If this is a significant factor, it could be
perfectly rational for the automobile workers to support universal
compulsory insurance. Why society provides implicit or (in most countries)
explicit coverage for all remains to be explained.
An Attempt to Control Providers
Another reason why the UAW leaders and others may favor a single
national health plan is in the hope of gaining some control over the
providers of medical care——the hospitals and the physicians. In recent
years one of the major frustrations faced by the auto workers and other
groups with extensive insurance coverage is the rapid escalation in the
price of medical care. They may believe that only a single source
national health insurance plan will be in a position to control provider
behavior and stop the escalation in costs. Moreover, there is strong6
evidence that they are not alone in this view. One of the puzzles for
economists has been to explain the traditional opposition of the medical
professionto legislation which, at least in the short run, increases
the demand for their services. This opposition probably stems in part
from the belief that national health insurance would ultimately result
in an increase in government control over providers.
Tax Advantages
Why do people buy shallow coverage——where the administrative
load is high and the risk element relatively small? One reason is that
when the premium is paid by the employer the implicit income is free of
tax. Even health insurance premiums paid by the individual are partially
deductible from taxable income. If the tax laws allowed employers to
provide tax—free "food insurance," we would undoubtedly see a sharp
increase in that type of fringe benefit. But again the explanation is
not very satisfactory. Why do the tax laws encourage the purchase of
medical care but not food, clothing, or other necessities? In an attempt
to answer this question,we should consider some of the characteristics of
medical care and health insurance that are different from conventional
commodities.
Externalities
One explanation for the popularity of national health insurance
that has great appeal for economists at the theoretical level is that
there are substantial external benefits associated with the consumption
of medical care. If this were true, then governmental subsidy of care7
need not be irrational; indeed it might be irrational not to provide
that subsidy. The best example of potential externalities is the
prevention or treatment of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis.
In earlier times these diseases constituted a very significant portion of
overall health problems, but are much less important today. Furthermore,
if a concern with externalities were the chief motivation, it would be
logical and feasible to subsidize those services (e.g. venereal disease
clinics) which are clearly addressed to the communicable diseases.
However, even economists who are strong advocates of national health
insurance, such as Lester Thurow, do not rely on the externality argument.
Thurow writes "Once a society gets beyond public health measures and
communicable diseases, medical care does not generate externalities."7
Mark Pauly has called attention to one special kind of
externality which probably is operative. It involves the satisfaction
people get from knowing that someone else who is sick is getting medical
attention.8 This satisfaction could be purchased by voluntary philan-
thropy, but the total amount so purchased is likely to be less than
socially optimal since each individual's giving tends to be based on his
or her private satisfaction, ignoring the effects on others. The solu-
tion may be compulsory philanthropy, i.e. tax—supported programs.
AMatter of "Life or Death"
Another explanation for national healthinsurance that has great
appeal at the theoretical level but carries less conviction empirically
is that "the market should not determine life or death." This theme is
advanced by Arthur Okun in his new book, Equality and Efficiency, the Big8
Tradeoff, and is a basic tenet of those who argue that "health care isa
right." There is considerable logic in the argument that societymay be
unwilling to accept the consequences of an unequal distribution of income
for certain kinds of allocation decisions such as whoserves in the army
during wartime, who gets police protection, and who faces other life—
threatening situations. It may be easier and more efficient to control
such allocations directly than to try to redistributemoney income
(possibly only temporarily) to achieve the desired allocation.
Although this explanation has a certain thoretical appeal, one
problem with it is that the vast majority of health services do not
remotely approach a "life or death" situation. Moreover, the ability
of medical care to make any significant contribution to lifeexpectancy
came long after Bismarck and Lenin advocated national health insurance.
Even today, when some medical care is very effective, it is possible
that housing, nutrition, and occupation have more influence on life
expectancy than does medical care, yet we allow inequality in the
distribution of income to determine allocation decisions in those areas.
According to Peter Townsend, there is no evidence that the British
National Health Service has reduced class differences in infant mortality,
maternal mortality, or overall life expectancy.If equalizing life
expectancy were society's goal, it is not at all clear that heavy emphasis
on national health insurance is an optimal strategy.
The emphasis on medical care rather than other programs that
might affect life expectancy is sometimes defended by the statement
that it is more feasible. Although diet or exercise or occupationmay
have more effect on life expectancy than does medical care, itmay be S9
technically simpler to alter people's consumption of medical care rather
than to alter their diet, etc. It has also been argued that it is
politically more feasible to push medical care rather than alternative
strategies. The distinction between technical and political feasibility
is not, of course, clear cut because the former depends in part on what
we are willing to do in the way of permitting government to intrude on
personal decisions——a political question. However, to the extent that
the popularity of national health insurance is said to be attributable
to its political feasibility, we have really not explained much. Its
political popularity is precisely the question we started with.
The Growth of Egalitarianism
Life expectancy aside, one way of interpreting the growth of
national health insurance is as an expression of the desire for greater
equality in society. British economists John and Sylvia Jewkes have
written,
The driving force behind the creation of the National Health
Service was not the search for efficiency or for profitable
social investment. It was something quite different: it was
a surging national desire to share something equally.-°
An American economist, C. M. Lindsay, has developed a theoretical
model which analyzes alternative methods for satisfying the demand for
equality of access to medical care. Among other things, he shows that
if this demand for equality is widespread, there are externalities
similar to those discussed by Pauly in connection with philanthropy.
Thus a free market approach will result in less equality than people
really demand. He also shows that the British National Health Service10
can perhaps best be understood as an attempt to satisfy this demand for
equality. He concludes, "... thepolitician's sensitive ear may read
the preferences of his constituents better than the econometrician with
,,11 his computer.
Why the demand for equality has grown over time and why it should
find expression in medical care more than in other goods and services
are not easy questions to answer. Is there really more altruism in
society now than before? Were Bismarck and Lenin the most altruistic
political leaders of their time? Is it simply the case that equality
is a normal "good", i.e. we buy more of it when our income rises? If
this is the explanation, what are the implications for equality in a
no—growth economy?
Perhaps there has been no real increase in altruism at all.
Perhaps what we observe is a response to an increase in the ability of
the less well—off to make life miserable for the well—off through strikes,
violence, and other social disruptions. On this view health insurance
is part of an effort to buy domestic stability. It may be that
industrialization and urbanization make us all more interdependent, thus
increasing the power of the "have-nots" to force redistributions of
one kind oranother. Or perhaps there has been a decline in the
willingness of the "haves" to use force to preserve the status quo.
Such speculations, if they contain some validity, would explain
a general increase in egalitarian legislation, but they would not help
much in explaining why this legislation has focused heavily on medical
care. Indeed, is it not curious that society should choose to emphasize
equality in access to a service that makes little difference at the11
margin in life expectancy or to economic or political position and power?
A cynic might argue that it is not curious at all since it is precisely
because medical care does not make much difference that those with power
are willing to share it more equally with those with less. Indeed, one
might argue that the more a society has significant, enduring class
distinctions, the more it needs the symbolic equality of national health
Insurance to blunt pressures for changes that alter fundamental class or
power relationships.
One egalitarian goal that has always had considerable acceptance
in the United States is equality of opportunity. Thus, a popular
argument in favor of national health insurance is that it would help to
equalize access to medical care for children. Some recent theoretical
work on the economics of the family, however, calls into question the
effectiveness of such programs. Gary Becker has argued that the thrust
of programs aimed at increasing investment in disadvantaged children can
be blunted by parents who can decrease their own allocation of time and
money to their children as investment by the state increases. The
increase in the welfare of the children, therefore, may be no greater
than if a cash subsidy equal to the cost of the program were given
directly to the parents. The ability of the "head" to reallocate family
resources may not, however, be as unconstrained as Becker's model assumes.
There may be legal or social constraints, or there may be a desire on the
part of the head to maintain the child's obedience, respect, or affec-
tion. Thus the importance of the reallocation effect is an empirical
question, about which at present we know virtually nothing.12
"PapaKnows Best"2
-
Anargument advanced by Thurow in favor of transfers in kind—--
such as national health insurance——is that some individuals are not
competent to make their owndecisions.He writes,
Increasingly we are coming to recognize that the world is not
neatly divided into the competent and the incompetent. There
is a continuum of individuals ranging from those who are competent
to make any and all decisions to those who are incompetent to make
any and all decisions.1-3
Thurow argues that if society desires to raise each family up to some
minimum level of real welfare, it may be more efficient to do it through
in—kind transfers than through cash grants. Even if we agree with this
general argument, it does not follow as a matter of logic that subsi-
dizing medical care brings us closer to a social optimum. It may be the
case, for instance, that the "less able" managers tend to overvalue
medical care relative to other goods and services, in which case Thurow
ought to want to constrain their utilization rather than encourage it.
More generally, there is the question whether government will,
on average, make "better" decisions than individuals. As Arrow has
stated in a slightly different context, "If many individuals, given
proper information, refuse to fasten their seat belts or insist on
smoking themselves into lung cancer or drinking themselves into
incompetence, there is no reason to suppose they will be any more
sensible in their capacity as democratic voters."4 Twoarguments have
been suggested to blunt Arrow's critique. The first is that the "less
able" are less likely to vote; therefore the electoralprocess produces
decisions that reflect the judgment of the more able members ofsociety.
Second, it has been suggested that there is considerable scope for13
discretionary behavior by elected representatives; they do not simply
follow the dictates of their constituents.15 It may be that their
judgment is generally better than that of the average citizen.
7I ,,16 An Offset to an Unjust Tax
Suppose the U.S. were defeated by an enemy in war and had to
pay an annual tribute to the enemy of $100 billion. Suppose further
that the enemy collected this tribute by a tax of a random amount on
American citizens chosen at random. The U.S. government might
decide that this tribute tax was unjust and that it would be more
equitable for the federal government to pay the tribute from revenues
raised by normal methods of taxation. If the enemy insisted on collecting
the tribute from individual citizens on a random basis, the government
could choose to reimburse those paying the tribute.
Some observers believe there is a close parallel between the
tribute example and expenditures for medil care. They see ill health
and the consumption of medical care as largely beyond the control of
the individual citizen——the cost is like an unjust tax——and the purpose
of national health insurance is to prevent medical expenditures from
unjustly changing the distribution of income. There is, of course, the
question whether, or how much, individuals can influence and control the
amount of their medical expenditures. Putting that to one side, however,
and assuming that the analogy is a good one, there are still some
questions that arise.
One might ask why the government has to intervene to protect
people against the tribute tax? Whycouldn'tcitizens in their private14
lives buy insurance against being taxed for tribute? The total cost and
the probabilities are known; therefore private insurance companies could
easily set appropriate premiums. One answer might be that this is also
inequitable to the extent that some people can afford the insurance more
easily than others. The government could easily remedy this, however,
by some modest changes in the distribution of income.
Another problem, of course, is that some people might not buy
the insurance. They would be "free riders" because if they were hit
with a big tribute tax they would be unable to pay and others would have
to pay in their place. Furthermore, they would be wiped out financially,
so that society would have to support their families.
To be sure, the government could both redistribute income to
take care of the premium and make insurance compulsory, but that becomes
almost indistinguishable from a national insurance plan. The only
difference then would be whether there is a single organization, the
government, underwriting the insurance, or whether there are several
private insurance companies.
In the tribute tax example we have assumed that the probability
of loss would be identical across the population, but this is clearly
not true for health insurance. One argument advanced in support of
national health insurance is that it does not require higher risk individuals
to pay higher premiums. A counter argument is that individuals do have
some discretion concerning behavior that affects health and concerning
the utilization of medical care for given health conditions. National
health insurance, it is alleged, distorts that behavior. A related
argument is that medical care will always have to be rationed in some15
way and that national health insurance requires the introduction of
rationing devices other than price and income. These devices carry
their own potential for inequity and inefficiency.
The Decline of the Family
Illness is as old as mankind, and, while frequently in the past
and not infrequently today, there is little that can be done to change
the course of disease, there is much that can be done to provide care,
sympathy, and support. Traditionally most of these functions were provided
within the family. The family was both the mechanism for insuring against
the consequences of disease and disability and the locus of the production
of care. The only rival to the family in this respect until modern times
was the church, a subject to be considered below.
With industrialization and urbanization, the provision of
insurance and of care tended to move out of the family and into the
market. Thus, much of the observed increase in medical care's share
of total economic activity is an accounting illusion. It is the result
of a shift in the production of care from the home, where it is not
considered part of national output, to hospitals, nursing homes and the
like, where it is counted as part of the GNP. Unlike the production of
bread, however, which also moved from the family to the market (and
stayed there), medical care, or at least medical insurance, increasingly
became a function of the state.
One possible explanation is that the state is more efficient
because there are significant economies of scale. With respect to the
production of medical care, the economies of scale argument can fairly16
safely be rejected. Except for some exotic tertiary procedures, the
economies of scale in the production of physicians' services and hospital
services are exhausted at the local or small region level. For the insur-
ance function itself, there may be significant economies of scale.
Definitive studies are not available, but the proposition that a single
national health insurance plan would be cheaper to administer than
multiple plans cannot be rejected out of hand.17 To be sure, a single
plan would presumably reduce consumer satisfaction to the extent that
the coverage of the plan would represent a compromise among the variety
of plans different individuals and groups might prefer.
The relationship between the declining importance of the family
and the growing importance of the state is complex. Not only can the
latter be viewed as a consequence of the former, but the causality can
also run the other way. Every time the state assumes an additional
function such as health insurance, child care, or benefits for the aged,
the need for close family ties becomes weaker. Geographic mobility
probably plays a significant role in this two—way relationship. One of
the reasons why people rely more on the state and less on their family
is that frequently the family is geographically dispersed. The other
side of the coin is that once the state assumes responsibilities that
formerly resided with the family, individuals feel freer to move away
from the family, both literally and figuratively.
It has often been alleged that these intra—family dependency
relationships are inhibiting and destructive to individual fulfillment.
Whether a dependency relationship with the state will prove less bur-
densome remains to be seen. There is also the question whether the
efficient provision of impersonal "caring" is feasible.17
The Decline of Religion
In traditional societies when the family was unable to meet the
needs of the sick, organized religion frequently took over. Indeed,
practically all of the early hospitals in Europe were built andstaffed
by the church and served primarily the poor. The developmentof strong
religious ties, with tithes or contributions frequently indistirguishable
from modern taxes, can be viewed as an alternative mechanism for dealing
with the philanthropic externalities discussed previously. Moreover, at
a time when technical medical care was so ineffective, religionoffered
a particular kind of symbolic equality——in the next worldif not in this
one. Thus, the decline of organized religion, along with the weakening
of the family, may have created a vacuum which the state is called upon
to fill.
The "Political" Role
When refugees from the Soviet Union were interviewed in Western
Europe after World War II, they invariably praised the West and disparaged
life in Russia——with one notable exception. They said they sorely missed
the comprehensive health insurance provided by the Sovietstate.18 It may
be that one of the most effective ways of increasing allegiance to the
state is through national health insurance. This was undoubtedly a
prime motive for Bismarck as he tried to weld the diverse German
principalities into a nation. It is also alleged that he saw national
health insurance as an instrument to reduce or blur the tension and
conflicts between social classes.
We live at a time when many of the traditional symbols and
institutions that held a nation together have been weakened and have18
fallen into disrepute. A more sophisticated public requiresmore
sophisticated symbols, and national health insurance may fit the role
particularly well.
Why Is the U.S. Last?
One rough test of the various explanations that have been pro-
posed is to see if they help us understand why the U.S. is the last major
developed country without national health insurance. Several reasons for
the lag can be suggested. First, there is a long tradition in the U.S.
of distrust of government. This country was largely settled by immi-
grants who had had unfavorable experiences with governments in Europe
and who had learned to fear government rather than look to it for support
and protection. Second, it is important to note the heterogeneity of
our population compared to some of the more homogeneous populations of
Europe. We are certainly not a single "people" the way, say, the
Japanese are. Brian Abel—Smith has noted, for instance, that the U.S.
poor were often Negroes or new immigrants with whose needs the older
19 white settlers did not readily identify.
The distrust of government and the heterogeneity of the population
probably account for the much better developed non—governmental voluntary
institutions in the U.S. Close observers of the American scene ever
since de Toqueville have commented on the profusion of private non—profit
organizations to deal with problems which in other countries might be
considered the province of government. These organizations can be viewed
as devices for internalizing the philanthropic externalities discussed
earlier in this paper, but the organizations are frequently limited to19
individuals of similar ethnic background, religion, region, occupation,
or other shared characteristic.
Another possible reason for the difference in attitudes between
the U.S. and Europe is the greater equality of opportunity in this
country. In the beginning this was based mostly on free or cheap land,
and later on widespread public education. Moreover, the historic class
barriers have been weaker here than in countries with a strong feudal
heritage. To cite one obvious example, consider the family backgrounds
of university faculties in Sweden and the U.S. Sweden is often hailed
as the outstanding example of a democratic welfare state, but the faculty
members at the leading universities generally come from upper class
backgrounds. By contrast, the faculties at Harvard, Chicago, Stanford,
and other leading American universities include many men and women who
were born in modest circumstances. With greater equality of opportunity
goes a stronger conviction that the distribution of income is related
to effort and ability. Those who succeed in the system have much less
sense of noblesse oblige than do the upper classes In Europe, many of
whom owe their position to the accident of birth. In the U.S., even
those who have not succeeded or only partially succeeded seem more
willing to acquiesce in the results.
Summing Up
The primary purpose of this inquiry has been to attempt to explain
the popularity of national health insurance around the world. My answer
at this point is that probably no single explanation will suffice.
National health insurance means different things to different people. It20
always has. Daniel Hirschfield, commenting on the campaign for national
health insurance in the United States at the time of World War I, wrote:
Some saw health insurance primarily as an educational and
public health measure, while others argued that it was an
economic device to precipitate a needed reorganization of
medical practice. ...Somesaw it as a device to save
money for all concerned, while others felt sure that it
would increase expenditures significantly.2°
Externalities, egalitarianism, the decline of the family and
traditional religion, the need for national symbols——these all may play
a part. In democratic countries with homogeneous populatIons, people seem
to want to take care of one another through programs such as national
health insurance, as members of the same family do, although not to the
same degree. In autocratic countries with heterogeneous populations,
national health insurance is often imposed from above, partly as a device
for strengthening national unity. The relative importance of different
factors undoubtedly varies from country to country and time to time,
but the fact that national health insurance can be viewed as serving so
many diverse interests and needs is probably the best answer to why
Bismarck and Woodcock are not such strange bedfellows after all.
.21
FOOTNOTES
1. See Abel—Smith [1969].
2. For a discussion of why the United States is the last to
adopt national health insurance, see page 18.
3. See Feldstein [1973].
4. See Friedman [1975].
5.See Stigler [1975].
6. See Stigler [1958].
7. See Thurow [1974].
8. See Pauly [1971].
9. See Townsend [1974].
10. See John and Sylvia Jewkes [1963].
11. See Lindsay [1969].
12. I am grateful to Sherman Maisel for suggestions concerning
this section.
13. See Thurow [1974], p. 193.
14. See Arrow [1974].
15. See Breton [1974].
16. I am grateful to Seth Kreimer for suggestions concerning
this section.
17. Maurice Le Clair [1975, p. 16] writes that the experience in
Saskatchewan clearly indicated economies of scale in the administration
of a virtually universal plan. See also further comments on this point
by Le Clair on p. 24.
18. See Field [1967], p. 14.
19. See Abel—Smith [1969].
20. See Hirschfield [1970].22
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